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Abstract
This paper studies optimal …nancial contracts and product mar-
ket competition under a strategic transparency decision. When …rms
seeking outside …nance resort to actively monitored debt in order to
commit against opportunistic behaviour, the dominant lender can in-
‡uence corporate transparency. More transparency about a …rm’s
competitive position has both strategic advantages and disadvantages:
in general, transparency results in higher variability of pro…ts and
output. Thus lenders prefer less information dissemination, as this
protects …rms when in a weak competitive position, while equityhold-
ers prefer more disclosure to maximize pro…tability when in a strong
position. We show that bank-controlled …rms will be opaque, while
shareholder-run …rms prefer more transparency. In fact, we can pre-
dict a clustering of characteristics associated with bank dominance:
opaqueness, low variability of pro…ts, slightly reduced average pro…ts,
uncertainty about assets in place, and relatively high …nancing needs
all should be observed jointly for bank controlled …rms.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Comparative corporate governance has long focused on the controversy be-
tween the proponents of market-centered versus institution-centered gover-
nance. The debate over their relative information e¢ciency is more recent.
On the one hand, in the spirit of Diamond (1984), it has been argued that
information gathering may be best delegated to large intermediaries to avoid
duplicating e¤orts. On the other hand, the market microstructure literature
has emphasized the importance of decentralized market trading to support
information collection (see, e.g., Holmström and Tirole (1993)).1
The present paper does not take a view on the quality of information-
gathering by banks versus markets; rather it focuses on their e¤ect on the dif-
fusion of information. Our starting point is the widely held perception that
bank-dominated …rms are more opaque.2 As in Bhattacharya and Chiesa
(1995), we argue that bank-dominated …nancing relationships are less trans-
parent to external observers. In contrast, market-based …nancing results in
more corporate information becoming known to both investors and competi-
tors.
There are some simple possible reasons for this. A main bank may be able
to fund or arrange directly the entire investment requirement by its creditor
…rm, thus limiting information leakage to the market. Bank loan monitoring
may reduce the need for public transparency; it may lead to a low level
of trading liquidity and this in turn may discourage information-gathering
by investors (see Boot and Thakor (2000) for an analysis of the interaction
of …rm information disclosure and investor information collection). In fact,
there is evidence that …rms with more opaque assets have less liquid securities
(see Hedge and McDermott (2000)).
This paper suggests a new explanation, recognizing that when informa-
tion is disclosed to more than one audience, this will have strategic e¤ects
in a context of imperfect competition (Bhattacharya and Ritter, 1982; Gert-
1A considerable literature has explored corporate performance in countries with active
capital markets and those economies such as Japan and Germany where markets have
less in‡uence and strong direct ties exist between companies and …nancial intermediaries.
See Mayer (1988) for an interesting descriptive approach, and, e.g., Rajan (1992) and von
Thadden (1995) for theoretical analyses.
2Although we know of no precise empirical study of this phenomenon (presumably
because of the di¢culty of classifying …rms as bank-dominated or not), Flannery, Kwan,
and Nimalendran (1998) present convincing evidence on the opaqueness of assets of banks’
themselves.
2ner, Gibbons and Scharfstein, 1988). Most of this literature has focused on
the incentive to disclose once a …rm has acquired some private information.
Firms with good news prefer more or less disclosure depending on the nature
of their private information. When it concerns their own strength, better
…rms may want to enhance visibility (e.g. by an IPO as a mean to commit
to more disclosure, as in Stoughton, Wong and Zechner, 1996).When good
information concerns the pro…tability of the market, and competitors may
choose to enter, …rms with better information prefer less disclosure, and thus
private, bilateral …nancing (Yosha, 1995; Gertner, Gibbons and Scharfstein,
1988). 3
We are interested in a strategic rather than tactical decision: we thus
investigate the long term transparency decision rather than ex post disclosure
choice. Speci…cally, we study the incentives for transparency under di¤erent
forms of corporate governance.
In our model, capital structure and investor dominance emerge endoge-
nously as the outcome of an optimal …nancing choice. Investors face both
potential managerial moral hazard and information asymmetry. Firms may
choose to raise debt, since more valuable …rms wish to avoid undervaluation
through an equity issue (as in Myers and Majluf, 1984), while the less valuable
…rms pool in order to bene…t from underpriced debt.4 Furthermore, investor
holdings may need to be concentrated in …rms which face severe moral haz-
ard problems, in order to ensure monitoring. We thus obtain an endogenous
corporate governance structure; in the case of concentrated debt, we speak of
bank dominance, while in the other cases we speak of equity dominance (ei-
ther internal or external). The case of managerial control can be subsumed
under either case, depending on the shape of their incentive scheme; fol-
lowing Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), we assume that their incentives have
been designed to be congruent with shareholders’ interest. Thus our model
generates in equilibrium a broad variation of …rm …nancing and governance
structures.
Dominant investors in our model focus on long-term decisions, such as
the transparency choice; this determines how easily and credibly ex post
information will be disseminated. In our framework, ex post information
3Hedge and McDermott (2000) …nd that …rms with more equity investment by banks,
and with higher leverage, have less liquid securities and higher measures of opaqueness.
4This is consistent with the pecking-order hypothesis (Myers, 1994): …rms choose to
issue the least information-sensitive liabilities to avoid adverse selection costs. For evidence
on the pecking order theory, see Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1994).
3is reliable only if the …rm has committed to a long-term disclosure policy
which will allow investors to ascertain objectively its true quality. Ex post a
transparent …rm is not able to suppress bad information; similarly, an opaque
…rm will not be able to reveal credibly any good news it may have.5
The reason why information dissemination matters is that …rms face prod-
uct market competition, so public information is observed by both investors
and competitors (as in Bhattacharya and Ritter (1982) and Gertner, Gibbons
and Scharfstein (1988)). The starting point of our analysis, which we borrow
from the literature on industrial organization, is that a …rm less transparent
than its competitor does not necessarily enjoy a strategic advantage. In fact,
more opaque …rms will exhibit less variability in pro…ts and output relative to
more transparent competitors. In addition, on average pro…ts are higher for
transparent …rms. These are general results from the theory of competition
under imperfect information (for an excellent survey, see Kühn and Vives,
1994).
The economic intuition for the impact of transparency on pro…ts is as
follows. Less transparent …rms reveal less to competitors on their competitive
strength. When …rms act on the basis of less information, their expectation
over competitors’ output is either too high or too low. This hurts …rms which
are strong, as it leads competitors to be more aggressive, forcing the …rm to
restrain its output; but it protects weak …rms, which face less aggressive
competition and can better protect their market share and pro…tability. As
a result, under less transparency expected pro…ts are lower, but the volatility
of pro…ts and output are lower as well. These results are quite robust and
hold for the case of Cournot as well as Bertrand competition regardless of
whether products are strategic complements or substitutes.
A reduced volatility (and in particular the higher pro…tability in low pro…t
states) has the e¤ect of increasing the return to all claimholders with a …xed
claim on the …rm. Consequently, there is a natural preference by lenders for
less information dissemination, as they do not gain from higher pro…ts but
su¤er from higher risk. Our main result - in the spirit of Jensen and Meck-
ling’s (1976) analysis of agency costs of debt and equity - is that dominant
5One example for this “bonding approach” to corporate disclosure to the decision to go
public. In Roëll’s (1996) review of this decision, enhanced visibility is cited as the …rst or
second most important motivation to go public. Mirroring this, somewhat ironically, the
most important costs are “increased pressure on senior management due to closer public
scrutiny” and disclosure requirements. This con…rms that the commitment to ex-post
disclosure can be costly.
4lenders will discourage transparency, as this would endogenously undermine
the value of their claims. Moreover, and beyond Jensen and Meckling (1976),
although this form of governance produces on average lower pro…ts, it can
arise as an equilibrium response to moral hazard and adverse selection.6
In contrast, …rms dominated by shareholder interests prefer greater trans-
parency, as information dissemination on average increases pro…tability as
well as risk.7
There are several empirical implications arising from our modelling. Lender-
dominated …rms (and …rms in bank-dominated …nancial systems) are less
transparent than equity-run …rms (and …rms in shareholder-oriented sys-
tems). Moreover, corporate pro…tability should be less volatile in bank-
dominated …rms, and slightly lower on average in equity-run …rms. In fact,
our theory predicts a clustering of attributes in …nancial contracting: we ex-
pect to observe jointly bank dominance, opaqueness, low variability of pro…ts,
slightly reduced average pro…ts, uncertainty about assets in place, and rela-
tively high …nancing needs. Because of the non-uniqueness of equilibria for
low levels of debt, these predictions should be stronger, the higher the level of
debt in the system. Bank dominance should be prevalent when moral hazard
on the side of the …rm is an important issue, either because of the ability
of managers to appropriate resources or of its incentives to divert them to
unpro…table operations (e.g. in conglomerate …rms).
There seems to be no empirical study covering all attributes predicted
by our theory. This is probably partially due to the di¢culty of de…ning
empirically our concept of investor dominance,8 but partially also because
the interplay of corporate governance, capital structure, and …rm behavior
has not yet received su¢cient attention by applied researchers. We hope that
our theoretical analysis helps to provide …rst stepping stones in this direction.
In the scattered empirical work available, there is evidence that Japanese
companies with in‡uential main banks have been less pro…table than more in-
6It is worth stressing that moral hazard and adverse selection both are crucial ingre-
diences of the model, because we endogenize two dimensions of the …nancing decision:
capital structure and corporate governance
7The well-known listing of Daimler-Benz on the NYSE, on pressure by Deutsche Bank,
which shed light on a traditionally opaque company, is an interesting example. While
Deutsche Bank was the dominant investor in Daimler-Benz, it held at the time more than
a quarter of the …rm’s equity, and acted thus probably more as a shareholder than as a
lender.
8But see Böhmer (1997) for an example of how to do and work with it.
5dependent companies (Caves and Uesaka, 1976; Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998)
and that transparency is greater for independent companies (Weinstein and
Yafeh, 1998). They also tend to be less liquidity constrained (Hoshi, Kashyap
and Scharfstein, 1991), which is consistent with our result that bank-monitored
…nance is available to …rms who would otherwise not obtain …nancing.9 Over-
all, these …rms appear to have less variability in pro…tability and grow com-
paratively less than independent companies (Nakatani, 1984). All these facts
are consistent with our result that bank-dominated …rms ought to be less
transparent and have lower average pro…ts and less volatility of economic
results than more transparent, market-…nanced rivals.
Another interesting case in point is Germany. Until 1998, disclosure re-
quirements for listed …rms in Germany were signi…cantly weaker than those
demanded by U.S. GAAP. In particular, neither cash ‡ow statements nor de-
tailed segment reports were mandatory under the German commercial code.
Yet, there was signi…cant variation in voluntary reporting practices. While
we do not know of empirical studies explicitly addressing our question of the
link between investor dominance, transparency, and earnings volatility, there
seems to have been a consensus that those …rms that voluntarily provided
more accounting information were ‘capital market-oriented’ as opposed to
dominated by interests of banks or private owners (see, e.g., Goebel and
Fuchs, 1995, Leuz, 1998).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out
the model. In sections 3 we analyze product market competition. Section
4 studies the transparency decision. Section 5 analyses …rm …nancing and
governance, o¤ers some interpretations and comparative statics. Section 6
concludes. In the Appendix we collect the formulae needed to derive our
results formally.
2 The Model
2.1 Product market interaction
The model is a dynamic game between two …rms and their investors, in which
…nancing and control decisions are taken …rst, and then the …rms compete
9For evidence on the costs and bene…ts of dominant bank …nancing in the U.S., see
Petersen and Rajan (1994).
6on the product market. We describe …rst the product market stage, and then
the earlier part of the game.
Once the two …rms are …nanced, they compete on the product market.
The …rms produce di¤erentiated products and act as Cournot competitors.
Firms have either a high quality or a lower quality product, which has an
e¤ect on the relative attractiveness of their own product vis-a-vis their com-
petitor’s. Quality is described by a parameter µi which can take two values.
When the product is of high quality, µi = µH, while µi = µL otherwise, with
µH >µ L. Product quality is uncertain; ex ante either …rm has a prior prob-
ability q of having a high quality product. The probability of high quality is
common to both …rms and commonly known.10 T h er e a l i z a t i o no fa… r m ’ sµ
may become publicly known before or after the production decision; we shall
discuss this in the next subsection. In either case, once output is realized,
customers base their purchase on actual quality.
The inverse demand function faced by …rm i is given by
Pi =
(
µi ¡ Qi ¡ °Qj if Qi + °Qj · µi
0 if Qi + °Qj ¸ µi
; (1)
where i =1 ;2;j6= i;and ¡1 · ° · 1. ° c a nb ei n t e r p r e t e da st h ed e g r e eo f
substitutability between the …rms’ products, and describes the intensity of
competition in the market. If °>0 the two goods are strategic substitutes
under Cournot competition; if °<0, the goods are strategic complements.
By inverting the demand system (1) one sees that Bertrand competition has
the same structure, with strategic complements becoming strategic substi-
tutes and vice versa. Hence, although our discussion is in terms of quantity
choices, the above speci…cation covers the Bertrand case as well.11
In order to focus on the impact of transparency on competition, we assume
that productivity is equal across …rms and that marginal costs for each …rm
are constant and normalized to zero.
Finally, we assume throughout that the production decision of the …rm
is taken by managers (who can be owners, see below) who maximize prof-
its, ¼i = PiQi. This is in contrast to an important strand of the literature
inspired by Brander and Lewis (1986), that analyses product market compe-
tition under the impact of capital structure. In particular, in Brander and
10Given our linear demand speci…cation, the di¤erence in product quality can as well
be interpreted as a di¤erence in marginal costs. The two formulatons are equivalent.
11This speci…cation of demand is standard and can be derived from quadratic preferences
of a representative consumer (see, e.g., Singh and Vives (1984)).
7Lewis (1986), if a …rm has risky debt, its equity holders have an incentive to
distort Qi away from the pro…t-maximizing level in order to take advantage
of limited liability. Since this e¤ect is empirically not well documented and
theoretically ambiguous, we choose to work with the simple assumption of
pro…t maximization.12 In particular, at the product market stage we assume
away the issue of opportunism by managers or inside equity holders (see, e.g.,
Hart, 1995). We introduce opportunism in the longer-term decisions about
investment discussed in the next subsection.
To simplify the presentation we impose three types of parameter restric-
tions. First, we shall assume that …rms produce a positive level of output
whatever the constellation of (µ1;µ 2), i.e. that there is no exit. This requires
assuming that demand even for a low quality product is su¢ciently strong.
The following assumption, which will be maintained throughout the paper,
is su¢cient to guarantee this in the di¤erent settings we consider later on:
µL ¸ µH ¡ µL: (2)
Second, we will concentrate on the case ° ¸ 0. And third, we assume that
equilibrium prices, and hence pro…ts, are positive in all contingencies. This
restriction is binding for competition under incomplete information when °
is close to 1 and q close to 0, i.e. when competition is head-on and quality
is likely to be low. In this case, competition is particularly severe, strategy
di¤erences between strong and weak …rms are particularly pronounced, and
the equilibrium price can be zero if a …rm turns out to be of high quality,
after all. The precise condition we impose is that
° + °(1 + °)(1 ¡ q) · 2: (3)
Condition (3) holds independently of q if ° · :73 and independently of °
if q ¸ 1=2. It is worth emphasizing that all our qualitative results continue to
hold if ° is negative or condition (2) or (3) are violated, only some formulae
will change. In fact, without (2) or (3) di¤erences in …rm characteristics and
behavior will be stronger and the variance result (Proposition 1) that drives
our analysis will be strengthened.
12We have investigated Brander-Lewis type incentives in an earlier version. The treat-
ment is much more complex and does not add much to our results. For theoretical work
on the general problem see, e.g., Maksimovic (1988), Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) and
Showalter (1995); for contrary empirical evidence see Chevalier (1995).
82.2 Finance and control
In order to enter the market described above, …rms need external …nancing
of I>0. Firms are di¤erentiated by the nature of their productive assets
and by the value of their existing operations. As we shall explain now, the
characteristics of the …rm in‡uence their interaction with the capital market,
both with respect to the terms of …nance and to the control rights of external
investors.
Firms are potentially subject to moral hazard in production. But some
…rms operate in sectors, countries, or environments in which the nature of as-
sets allows external …nanciers to eliminate moral hazard more easily, whereas
the activity or location of other …rms makes it more di¢cult to control man-
agerial discretion. The moral hazard and control problem is an elementary
version of the model used by Holmström and Tirole (1997,1998); we assume
that, unless controlled, the owner or manager of the …rm can divert the new
funds I, more or less e¢ciently, and that there is no diversion at all when she
is controlled. As, for example, in Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1998), …rms
di¤er in their ability to divert funds: a “type-Á”… r mo b t a i n sÁI, 0 · Á · 1,
for private consumption when it diverts I. Hence, Á =0…rms are e¤ectively
immune to moral hazard, whereas Á =1…rms can divert funds on a 1:1 basis.
In general, the degree of exposure to moral hazard will be a continuous
variable; to facilitate the exposition, we consider only the extremes where
managerial moral hazard does not play a role at all (Á =0 )a n dw h e r e
managerial discretion is so large that it poses serious control problems (Á =
1). A …rm’s Á is public information. For simplicity, we further assume that
control causes no direct costs to the controller, but that a large stake is
required to be able to exert in‡uence.13
In the spirit of Myers and Majluf (1984), the value of existing operations
is private information. Overall …rm value, therefore, has two components:
the value from existing operations, V 2f VL;V Hg;V L <V H, and the return ¼
from the new venture, if undertaken. Investors know the ex-ante distribution
of V ,w i t hp r o b(V = VH)=h and prob (V = VL)=1¡ h. Firms cannot
signal their type by any action besides the type of …nancing they seek.14
13It is not di¢cult to embellish the model by considering a more re…ned moral hazard
problem, less than perfect control, or positive monitoring costs. However, there are no
insights to be gained from such additional e¤ort.
14Note we have assumed that the moral hazard of Á =1- …rms only concerns the new
liquid funds I. This is a reasonable …rst approximation. Our results would be strengthened
9The variables Á and V are independent across the population of …rms.
There are, therefore, four possible …rm types: (Á;V )=( 0 ;V L), (0;V H),
(1;V L), (1;V H).
To simplify notation, we assume that the …rm has no debt to begin with.
It is straightforward to verify that our analysis would continue to hold if the
…rm had some debt outstanding. The …nancing options for the new venture
consist of di¤used equity (DE), concentrated equity (CE), di¤used debt (DD),
or concentrated debt (CD). Concentration requires a large investor who takes
a signi…cant stake in the company and is granted some control rights to
oversee management decisions. We interpret concentrated debt as main bank
…nancing and dispersed debt as bond …nancing (or multiple bank …nancing).
When the …rm issues concentrated debt it becomes bank-dominated; else it
is equity dominated, either by inside equity (under DE or DD) or by outside
equity (under CE).
We do not consider the possibility of a mix of debt and equity …nancing
for the new investment. As will become clear later, this creates no loss of
generality as far as DE, CE, and DD are concerned (which can be arbitrarily
combined without changing the analysis). If, however, controlling debt stakes
could be su¢ciently small (and be combined with any of the other options to
raise the total of I), the analysis would change. Yet, we view this possibility
as implausible, because typically some concentration of lending is needed to
provide su¢cient incentives for the lender to monitor.15
As mentioned earlier, we assume that “day-to-day” productive decisions
such as the level of output Q are taken by managers so as to maximize pro…ts.
On the other hand, we assume that dominant investors can exert in‡uence
over some longer-term strategic choices and focus here on one particular such
choice, namely that of a …rm’s transparency.
Thus, we de…ne investor dominance as the ability to control managerial
moral hazard and the capacity to determine the transparency policy of a
…rm. This latter policy is a long-term choice which takes place before …rms
receive private information about their product market prospects (given by
µi). A …rm may choose a policy of transparency either by maintaining a broad
ex-ante disclosure policy, facilitating access to management and company re-
sources for analysts and researchers, creating a transparent asset structure in
the sense empirically studied by Hedge and McDermott (2000), encouraging
if we assumed that the …rm can also divert a fraction of returns from existing projects.
15Holmström and Tirole (1997) make this point elegantly in a more detailed model.
10secondary trading in the …rm’s stock, list on stock exchanges with stringent
disclosure requirements, etc.16
For simplicity, we assume that a …rm can be either transparent (T)o r
opaque (O) with no di¤erential cost. For a transparent …rm, its quality pa-
rameter µi becomes publicly known once it is realized. If a …rm is opaque, its
µi is private knowledge to the …rm at the production stage. We do not
model here how information is disseminated, see Bhattachya and Chiesa
(1995), in a banking context, and Perotti and von Thadden (1998), in a
market-microstructure context, for explicit models of this issue. The revela-
tion mechanism cannot be changed after private information is obtained.17
2.3 Summary: the game
To wrap up the description of the model, we summarize here the stages of the
game, together with the relevant decision variables. The game is among two
…rms, drawn from a large population of ex-ante identical and independent
…rms, and a large number of risk-neutral investors.
1. Firms’ types (Á;V ) are realized. Á becomes public information, V is
private information to the …rm.
2. Firms choose their form of …nancing among DE, CE, DD, and CD,
in order to raise I. If a …rm chooses debt, it o¤ers a standard debt
contract D>0; if it chooses equity, it o¤ers a fraction of its equity
s 2 (0;1).
3. Investors accept the o¤er or not; in cases of several acceptances or
oversubscription, the …rm chooses its investors randomly.
4. If the …rm issues concentrated …nance (CE or CD), the controlling in-
vestor chooses whether to monitor management and chooses the …rm’s
16For the latter, the decision by European …rms to list on the NYSE is an example.
Another example is the decision to switch from the British Unlisted Securities Market to
the O¢cial List of the LSE. For an empirical analysis of listing decisions driven by such
motives, see Kukies (1999).
17There will be, of course, an ex-post incentive to reveal more if the information is good,
or less if the information is bad. We assume that there is no credible way to selectively
communicate this information ex post, unless a reliable mechanism has been established
in advance to allow information to be veri…ed by outsiders.
11transparency policy, C 2f T;Og. If there is no controlling investor, the
…rm chooses C.
5. In the absence of monitoring, …rms of type Á =1choose whether to
divert the funds raised, I. Firms who have received external funding
and not diverted it, invest I.
6. For those …rms that have invested, product quality µ is realized. For
transparent …rms, this information becomes public immediately, for
opaque …rms µ is private information..
7. Firms compete by choosing quantities Q (if there is only one …rm to
have invested, it acts as a monopolist).
8. Firm quality is publicly revealed, demand and returns ¼ are realized,
and investors are repaid. Under an equity contract, investors receive
s(V + ¼) or sV , depending on whether the …rm has invested or not;
under a debt contract, investors receive either min (V + ¼;D) or min
(V;D).
3 Product Market Competition
We analyze the game using the concept of perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium,
by …rst solving for equilibria of the subgame starting at stage 4 of the over-
all game tree. This is possible, because the asymmetric information about
existing operations, V , has no impact on the product market interaction in
stages 4 - 8. Of course, the form of the …nance contract chosen in stages 1
- 3 matters for the second phase of the game. But taking these contracts
as given, decisions in the second phase are independent of the value of V of
either …rm.
We …rst examine, in this section, the impact of more or less public in-
formation on product market interaction. This amounts to …nding the Nash
equilibria of the interaction at stage 7. Because of the assumption that man-
agers maximize expected gross pro…ts at the product market stage, this game
can be analyzed without regard to capital structure.
If a …rm acts as a monopolist (either because the other …rm has received
no funding or because it has diverted its funds), its choice is trivial, and
in particular, does not depend on its transparency. We consider therefore
12the subgame with two competing …rms. As …rm quality µ is either public
information or it remains private, we have two possible informational states
for each …rm, resulting from the choices in stage 4: T (µ revealed) or O
(µ private information). In total, this yields four subgames, which we shall
discuss now in turn.
3.1 Competition under symmetric information
We …rst consider competition under symmetric information, de…ned as a
situation in which the information on each …rm’s µ is public.
Both …rms simultaneously choose their quantities Qi to maximize pro…ts,
taking the other’s choice as given. Hence, …rm i chooses Q as to max
Q (µi ¡
Q ¡ °Qj)Q:
Firm i’s behavior will depend on its own µ and that of its competitor.
W et h e r e f o r eh a v ef o u rd i ¤ e r e n tp o s s i b l es t a t e s ,ij = HH;HL;LH;LL,f o r
the interaction. It is straightforward to verify that the …rm’s actions in Nash





































where the superscript TT denotes the fact that both …rms’ µ have been
revealed. QTT
ij denotes a …rm’s equilibrium action if itself has quality µi and
its competitor quality µj. By assumption (2) all these quantities are positive.


















13where LH is the worst possible state for …rm i and the …rm makes lower
pro…ts than in state LL, the second worst state, etc.18
The analysis of this standard form of market interaction is quite simple.
The e¤ect of complete information is to produce some implicit coordination
on output decisions, as each …rm conditions its production on the actual
strength of its competitor’s demand and thus on the competitor’s ability to
expand beyond its own market.
3.2 Competition under symmetrically incomplete in-
formation
We now consider the case of competition when there is no public information
about any …rm’s quality available. We shall index all variables by OO,a sa l l
the µ’s are private information.
Now each …rm makes its output decision at a time when there is imperfect
information about the level of its competitor’s product-speci…c demand µj.
In this case each …rm will choose output as a function only of its own µi,a n d





(µi ¡ Qi ¡ °qQOO
H ¡ °(1 ¡ q)QOO
L )Qi if Qi · µi ¡ °QOO
H
(1 ¡ q)(µi ¡ Qi ¡ °QOO
L )Qi if µi ¡ °QOO
H · Qi · µi ¡ °QOO
L




i denotes a …rm’s equilibrium action when it has quality µi (note
that equilibria are player-symmetric). The logic behind formula (6) is simple:
if …rm i chooses a very high quantity (Qi ¸ µi ¡ °QOO
L ), then it is sure to
drive prices to zero; if it chooses a smaller, but su¢ciently high quantity
(µi ¡ °QOO
H · Qi · µi ¡ °QOO
L ), prices will be zero if the opponent is
strong and positive if the opponent is weak; and for all other quantities
(Qi · µi ¡ °QOO
H ) prices will always be positive.
It is readily veri…ed that the game again has a unique (Bayesian) Nash
equilibrium. As assumed in Section 2, we restrict attention to parameters
for which the …rst case in (6) is relevant, in order to keep the calculations
simple. It is then straightforward to show that assumption (3) implies





LL : in LL; the worst possible state for …rm i, it produces less than in state LH,t h e






























LH, are obtained by straightforward computations
reported in the appendix.
As in the case of symmetric information, it is easy to show that these










By direct computation, one can check that both, expected value and vari-
ance of pro…ts under symmetrically informed competition are higher than un-
der symmetrically uninformed competition. This fact re‡ects a general result
from the industrial organization literature (see, e.g., Kühn and Vives, 1994)
and is at the heart of our argument in this paper. It is, therefore, useful to
discuss its underlying rationale. The main di¤erence in strategic interaction
between the symmetrically informed and the symmetrically uninformed case
is less aggressive output choice by the stronger …rm in the most favorable
state HL when both are uninformed: the weaker …rm is “protected” by the
lack of accurate information. In contrast, there is more output in the HH
state, as both …rms, attaching some probability the event of the competitor
being weak, produce more aggressively than in a transparent system. This
can be interpreted as a result of “poor coordination” due to less information,
and leads to lower pro…tability. Similarly, under uninformed competition,
output in state LL is lower, as both …rms are too cautious due to the per-
ceived risk of a strong competitor, and …rms are more protected when in
their weakest competitive position LH.
Thus the coordination failure due to lack of information makes pro…ts
higher on average for weaker …rms. From an ex ante perspective, however,
the reduced pro…tability due to poor coordination in high quality states,
when marginal pro…tability is highest, is greater than the pro…t gain in low
quality states. Hence, lack of information reduces expected pro…ts (over all
states) together with the variance.
153.3 Competition under asymmetric information
T h el a s tc a s et oc o n s i d e ri st h ea s y m m e t r i cc a s e ,i nw h i c ht h et y p eo fo n e
…rm, say …rm 1, is unknown to the market, whereas the other’s type is known.
Now …rm 1, when making its output decision, knows the state of …rm 2,b u t
…rm 2 does not know µ1. In this case, …rm 1 will choose output as a function
of µ1 and µ2 and therefore produce as to max
Q (µ1 ¡ Q ¡ °Q2(µ2))Q; where Q
depends on µ1 and µ2: Firm 2, on the other hand, seeks to maximize
Eµ1P2Q2 =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
(µ2 ¡ Q2 ¡ °qQ1(µH;µ 2) ¡ °(1 ¡ q)Q1(µL;µ 2))Q2
if Q2 · µ2 ¡ °Q1(µH;µ 2)
(1 ¡ q)(µ2 ¡ Q2 ¡ °Q1(µL;µ 2))Q2
if µ2 ¡ °Q1(µH;µ 2) · Q2 · µ2 ¡ °Q1(µL;µ 2)
0 if Q2 ¸ µ2 ¡ °Q1(µL;µ 2);
(8)
where Q2 depends on µ2 only.
It is straightforward (if lengthy) to show that the game has a unique
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spell out in the appendix, again for the case de…ned in assumption (3), in
which the …rst line in (8) is relevant. Here, QTO
i is the equilibrium quantity
produced by the …rm whose µ is known (and who cannot condition on the
other …rm’s strength), and QOT
ij the quantity produced by the …rm with pri-
vate information about its type (who faces a transparent competitor) when
its own quality is i and that of its competitor j. The corresponding eight
pro…t levels (for each state and each …rm) are given in the appendix.
Again, it can easily be veri…ed that equilibrium quantities and pro…ts are
ordered as in the two equilibria under symmetric information. For example,
the pro…ts of a transparent …rm facing an opaque …rm are highest when the
…rm has high quality and the competitor low quality, second highest when
both have high quality, third highest when both have low quality, and lowest
when the …rm has low and its competitor high quality.
In order to understand the costs and bene…ts of disclosure in this context,
it is useful to compare the pro…t levels of …rm i in the case where both …rms
are transparent (¼TT)w i t ht h o s ew h e r e… r mj is transparent but …rm i not
(¼OT). Direct inspection shows that pro…ts are more variable under fully
transparent competition than under competition with asymmetric informa-
tion. As in the case discussed in the last subsection, the reason is that by
disclosing more, the …rm allows its competitor to react more precisely to the
16situation on the product market, which makes the intercept of its residual
demand more volatile (see Fried (1984), Li (1985), Shapiro (1986)).
What is more, one can show that pro…ts are ordered state by state. Pro…ts
under full transparency, ¼TT, are a “median-preserving spread” of pro…ts
under unilateral non-transparency, ¼OT, in the sense that ¼TT is statewise
lower than ¼OT in the two unfavorable states (LL; LH)a n ds t a t e w i s eh i g h e r
in the two favorable states (HH;HL). Hence, expected pro…tability is always
higher for the T - …rm than for the O - …rm in the strong quality state,
and vice versa in the weak quality state. Building on our discussion in the
last subsection, the economic intuition is as follows. When in the state of
high demand, a …rm whose quality is public information (T) can produce
more aggressively than if it were opaque, because the …rm knows that its
competitor knows its strength, and will thus restrain its output. In addition,
in this case the T - …rm does not restrain its output when its competitor
is strong, since it does not know it. The analogue argument applies for the
low quality state. Hence, being transparent confers an important strategic
advantage - the advantage of forcing the other to restrain himself when one
is strong, i.e. when the gains from aggressiveness are highest -, even if the
competitor remains opaque.
Because of the convexity of pro…ts in µ (see (A11) - (A15) in the ap-
pendix), the increased volatility of pro…ts under transparency has an in-
teresting consequence: outward shifts of high pro…t realizations are more
important than downward shifts of low realizations. This, however, increases
the mean. Formally, it can be checked by direct calculation that this holds
true regardless of the choice C 2f T;Og of the other …rm. The above …nd-
ings about relative pro…t levels drive our analysis of transparency choice in
the next section; we, therefore, summarize them in the following proposition.
We note in passing that what is important for the analysis is the variance
result, not that on mean pro…ts.
Proposition 1 For any choice C 2f T;Og of the other …rm, the mean and
the variance of a …rm’s pro…ts are higher under transparency than under
opacity: E¼TC >E ¼ OC and var ¼TC > var ¼OC.
Proof. Direct computation shows that
E¼
TT ¡ E¼
OT = q(1 ¡ q)
°2




) > 0 (9)
17E¼
TO¡ E¼
OO = q(1 ¡ q)
°2





The result for the variances follows similarly.
4 Moral Hazard and Transparency Choice
In stages 4 and 5 of the game, dominant investors decide whether to monitor,
and moral-hazard-prone …rms (Á =1 ) who are not monitored decide whether
to invest their funds or whether to divert them. We now analyze these
decisions working backwards, beginning with the …rms’ decision in stage 5.
4.1 Diversion
Consider a …rm of asset type Á =1who is not monitored, either because
it has no dominant investor or because its dominant investor decided not to
monitor. In either case, its payo¤ from diverting its funds depends on the
type of outside …nance it has raised in stages 2 and 3 of the game and on the
transparency choice in stage 4.
Suppose …rst that the …rm has been …nanced through debt with face value
D. Then the …rm will divert its funds instead of investing, if and only if
E¼ max(V + ¼ ¡ D;0) <I+m a x ( V ¡ D;0); (11)
where V 2f VL;V Hg is the …rm’s value without investment and ¼ the return
from investing (here ¼ is any of the random variables derived in the last
section - which one is decided in stage 4 - or the monopoly return). Similarly,
the …rm diverts under equity …nance if and only if
(1 ¡ s)E¼¼<I : (12)
Both conditions, (11) and (12), simply state that the return from investing
I is smaller than the gain from stealing I.
4.2 Monitoring
In stage 4 of the game, dominant investors, if they exist, decide whether to
monitor Á =1- …rms. This decision depends on what they know about the
…rm’s existing value V . Consider, for example, the case where the …nancing
18choice in stages 2 and 3 has been CD, i.e. the dominant investor is a creditor.
If stages 2 and 3 have revealed the …rm’s V , the creditor will monitor if and
only if (11) holds and
E¼ min(V + ¼;D) ¸ min(V;D); (13)
i.e. if the debtor would divert and the returns with monitoring exceed those
without. Clearly, condition (13) is always satis…ed. The reason why we note
this obvious inequality, is to show that the argument would continue to hold
for small positive monitoring costs (which would be added on the right hand
side of (13).
With the assumption of small monitoring costs, the other subgames are
similarly obvious: a dominant investor will monitor a Á =1-… r mi fa n do n l y
if the …rm would divert otherwise.
4.3 Transparency
The other decision taken in stage 4 of the overall game is the choice of
transparency, either by the …rm itself (if there is no dominant investor) or by
the dominant investor. If (o¤ the equilibrium path) the contracts in stage 2
and 3 are such that one …rm does not obtain funding or diverts its funds in
stage 5, there is only one …rm on the market in stage 6 to 8, and transparency
does not matter.19 We can, therefore, focus on the case of two …rms who will
compete on the product market.
Consider …rst a …rm that is equity …nanced. The following proposition is
a straightforward implication of Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 For an equity-…nanced …rm (choices CE or DE in stages 2
and 3), transparency is a dominant strategy in the subgame of transparency
choice in stage 4.
Indeed, because transparency causes an increase in mean pro…ts regard-
less of the competitor’s choice, whoever controls the …rm prefers transparency
19Remember that transparency is a strategic tool to in‡uence product market compe-
tition. It does not matter for a monopolist, because consumer purchases are made under
full information.
19over opaqueness, as long as his payo¤ is increasing in E¼.20 As mentioned
earlier, Proposition 2 continues to hold if the …rm has debt outstanding,
but is equity controlled. This also follows from the next proposition, which
considers the subgames following dispersed debt …nancing (where the …rm’s
equity holders are in control).
Proposition 3 If a …rm is …nanced through dispersed debt, transparency is
a dominant strategy in the subgame of transparency choice.
Proof. Denote the debt level of the …rm in question by D. Given the choice
C 2f T;Og of the other …rm, the …rm prefers to be transparent if and only
if
±C(D): =E max (V + ¼
TC ¡ D;0) ¡ E max (V + ¼
OC ¡ D;0) ¸ 0: (14)
As discussed in Section 3, it is straightforward to show by direct calcu-
lation that pro…ts under TC are more variable than under OC (for C 2
fT;Og), with ¼TC being a “median-preserving spread” of ¼OC, in the sense
that ¼TC is statewise lower than ¼OC in the two unfavorable states for the
…rm in question (LL; LH) and statewise higher in the two favorable states
(HH; HL). Figure 1 summarizes this …nding graphically.
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Figure 1: Comparison of ¼TC and ¼OC for C 2f O;Tg
This state-by-state comparison of pro…t levels implies that ±C(D) > 0
for all D<V+ ¼TC
HL if only ±C(0) > 0. This is because the graph of ±C is
20Dominance is only weak in some o¤-the equilibrium- path subgames, because the …rm
may be a monopolist or embezzle regardless of transparency choice (which is the case if
(12) holds even if the …rm chooses T).
20(weakly) single-peaked, which becomes clear when walking backwards from
V + ¼TC
HL (where ±C =0 )i nF i g u r e2 .
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Figure 2: The graph of ±C
In other words, ±C is positive for all D if only E¼TC >E ¼ OC, which has
b e e ns h o w ni nP r o p o s i t i o n1 .
As discussed in Section 3, the e¤ect of information revelation is in general
to produce some implicit coordination in output decisions, as the informed
…rm conditions its production on the actual strength of its competitor’s de-
mand and thus on the competitor’s ability to market aggressively. This im-
plicit coordination is so valuable that an equity-controlled …rm unilaterally
prefers to become transparent. Hence, the case of equity control is a direct
generalization of the literature on endogenous information sharing, cited in
Section 3, to the case of a capital structure with debt and equity.
The …nal subgames to consider at the stage of transparency choice are
those in which a creditor is in control (CD). Here, two technical problems
of little economic interest can complicate the analysis compared to that of
Propositions 2 and 3. First, if the required loan, I, is smaller than VL +¼TC
LH
(the smallest possible return to investing if the other …rm chooses C), then
debt will be riskless, D = I, and lenders will be indi¤erent between trans-
parency and opaqueness. And second, if debt is so high (close to VH+¼TC
HL in
Figure 1) that the debtor goes bankrupt almost all the time, then the creditor
will behave like the residual claimant and is, of course, indistinguishable from
an equity investor. Neither of these two points poses a technical problem for
21the analysis, but both create uninteresting sub-cases; to focus the exposi-
tion we shall assume them both away. For the …rst problem, this amounts
to assuming that I is su¢ciently large to make debt risky, independent of
the transparency choice of the other …rm. For the second, this requires to
assume that I is not so big as to make debt look like equity. More precisely,
we assume




LH) <I¿ VH + ¼
TT
HL:21 (15)
We can now state the sequel to Propositions 2 and 3.
Proposition 4 Assume that a …rm is …nanced with concentrated debt and
that Assumption (15) holds. If the creditor believes with some positive proba-
bility that the …rm is of type VL, then the creditor’s dominant strategy in the
transparency subgame in stage 4 is opaqueness, C = O.
The proof is analogous to the one of Proposition 3 and omitted.22
The key feature of the case of creditor control is that the dominant interest
now is to protect the downside of pro…ts. As this downside is greater under
opaqueness than under transparency (see Figure 1), the creditor will prefer
opaqueness, even though its expected value is lower, if his debt is risky under
transparency. As long as the creditor is not certain that the …rm is of type
VH, Assumption (15) is a su¢cient condition for debt being risky under
transparency: as D>I , there is a positive probability (q(1 ¡ q) times the
probability the creditor attaches to VL)t h a tVL + ¼TO
LH <D .P r o p o s i t i o n4
provides a converse to Propositions 2 and 3: whereas in the case of equity
control …rms will be transparent, dominant lenders will avoid transparency,
if debt is risky. These results are surprisingly strong, as this behavior is
produced by dominant strategies.
21The …rst inequality deals with the …rst of the two points raised and rules out multiple
equilibria generated by indi¤erence - not a very interesting case. For a full analysis, see
Perotti and von Thadden (1998). The second ineqality states that I should be su¢ciently
smaller than the right hand side. The precise threshold is given by the smaller of the two
IC, C 2f T;Og, for which IC = E¼hmin(VH + ¼OC;D)+( 1¡ h)min(VL + ¼OC;D) =
E¼hmin(VH +¼TC;D)+(1¡h)min(VL+¼TC;D). This threshold lies between VL+¼OO
HH
and VH +¼TT
HL (the maximum possible return) and is typically so high that the constraint
in assumption (15) is not binding.
22A minor twist compared to that proof is that the controlling party here may not know
the …rm’s pro…tability (if the …nancing in stage 2 and 3 is pooling). Therefore, the proof
is in two (very similar) parts, one for the case of pooling, one for separating (and has more
parts if one wants to consider mixed-strategy equilibria in the …nancing game).
22Hence, if a …rm is debt controlled, its dominant investor will choose
opaqueness, a strategy which reduces the …rm’s expected pro…ts. The in-
teresting question, to which we turn now, is why a …rm may approach such
an investor.
5F i n a n c e
The last step in our backwards induction analysis is the …nancing game in
stages 2 and 3, where we will …rst study the interaction between one …rm
and the capital market. Given the dominance results in the last section, the
case of two …rms will be a simple extension. To simplify notation, we …rst
suppress the reference to the other …rm and let ¼T = ¼TC and ¼O = ¼OC
denote the (random) future returns from investing, holding the transparency
choice C of the other …rm …xed. If the other …rm does not invest, ¼T = ¼O is
the monopoly pro…t. If the other …rm invests, Proposition 1 has shown that
E¼T >E ¼ O.
Let us …rst consider the case of a …rm without a moral hazard problem
(Á =0 ). In this case, there is no need for outside monitoring, and the …rm
will …nance itself through dispersed debt or outside equity, depending on its
return characteristics. As this case is relatively standard corporate …nance,
we do not develop it here. The only feature of importance in our context is
that the …rm will be equity controlled, and therefore, by Propositions 2 and
3, transparent.
The more interesting case is that of a moral-hazard prone …rm, i.e. Á =
1. We shall focus on the pooling equilibrium in which both types of V 2
fVL;V Hg issue concentrated debt with zero expected pro…ts to the investors.
The …rm’s debt level, D¤,i st h e ng i v e nb y
E¼;V min(V + ¼
O;D
¤)=I: (16)
Under this contract, both types of …rms will be bank monitored and non-
transparent. Denote the expected payo¤ of …rm type i = L;H under this
contract by
Pi = E¼ max(Vi + ¼
O ¡ D
¤;0): (17)
In order for this contract to be an equilibrium, several assumptions need
to be satis…ed. We will …rst derive these assumptions and later discuss their
23restrictiveness. The …rst assumption is that the …rm must be willing to
undertake the project at all under these terms. This means
Pi ¸ Vi;i = L;H: (18)
The next two assumptions concern deviations by the …rm to di¤erent
…nancing choices. In order to establish the proposed pooling equilibrium, we
require that under the most unfavorable market belief following a deviation,
such a deviation is less pro…table to the …rm than the equilibrium contract.
In other words, we assume that o¤-the-equilibrium-path beliefs by the market
are pessimistic. This assumption is in the spirit of Myers and Majluf’s (1984)
original work and of most of the empirical work on the pecking order, and
yields a minimal set of restrictions for our analysis.
The …rst assumption in this vein excludes deviations to dispersed debt:
E¼ max(VL + ¼
T ¡ D;0) <I+m a x ( VL ¡ D;0); (19)
where D is given by E¼ min(VL + ¼
T;D)=I: (20)
Condition (20) describes the o¤-the-equilibrium scenario in which the …rm
raises fairly priced dispersed debt (with pessimistic market beliefs). Then
there is no monitoring (by assumption), in which case we know from Propo-
sition 3 that the …rm prefers transparency over opaqueness. Condition (19)
now states that the VL type of …rm in this situation will prefer to divert its
funds. The payo¤ expected by investors, therefore, is min(VL;D) (remember
the assumption that market beliefs are pessimistic), which, by Assumption
(15), is strictly smaller than I. Thus fairly priced dispersed debt …nancing
is not an option, as investors would refuse to underwrite it. Clearly, unfairly
priced debt would only increase the …rm’s moral hazard problem.
The second assumption concerning alternative funding choices concerns
equity …nance. In order for a …rm not to deviate to equity …nance, we assume
Pi ¸ (1 ¡ s)(Vi + E¼¼
T);i = L;H; (21)
where s is given by s(VL + E¼¼
T)=I: (22)
Given our assumption of zero monitoring costs, (21) is necessary and
su¢cient for a deviation to equity …nance to be unpro…table under pessimistic
24market beliefs (remember that by Proposition 2 controlling equity holders will
choose transparency).
Conditions (18), (19) and (21) are necessary and su¢cient for an equilib-
rium with concentrated debt to exist. Condition (18) implies that the new
investment is pro…table even under opaqueness, so that E¼O >I .P r o p o s i -
tion 1 then ensures that the project is pro…table under transparency. (19)
demands that the moral hazard problem is su¢ciently severe for the low-value
…rm (i.e. that new ventures create a large temptation to abuse funding), and
(21) requires that the value dilution problem is su¢ciently severe for both
types of …rm.23 Finally, condition (21) requires that the value loss through
lack of transparency be not too large.
The previous discussion had assumed the behavior of the other …rm and
its …nanciers to be …xed. Dropping this notational assumption, our discussion
implies the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Let D¤ be given by




(A1) I>V L + ¼TO
LH,
(A2) E¼ max(VH + ¼OO ¡ D¤;0) ¸ VH,
(A3) VL + E¼TO < 2I,
(A4) E¼ max(VH + ¼OO ¡ D¤;0) ¸ (1 ¡ I
VL+E¼¼TO)(VH + E¼¼TO),
(A5) E¼ max(VL + ¼OO ¡ D¤;0) ¸ VL + E¼¼TO¡ I.
Then there exists a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the overall …nancing
game in which the VL and the VH type of type Á =1…rms are both …nanced
by concentrated debt with the same face value D¤ and in which both …rms are
opaque.
Proof. We know from the earlier discussion that the existence of the pooling
equilibrium in the game between a …rm and its investors, taking the other
…rm’s decision C as …xed, is equivalent to the …ve conditions (18), (19) and
(21). Here we consider C = O. Condition (A1) is the …rst half of assumption
23Note that (21) is a stronger condition than what is needed in the standard Myers-
Majluf model, because here a deviation from debt to equity increases the expected value
of the investment.
25(15) in section 4; it can be veri…ed that the second half of (15) is implied
by the positive net worth condition E¼OO >I , which in turn is implied by
(A2). (A3) is just (19), noting that D>V L and substituting in for D.( A 4 )
and (A5) are (21). (A2) states that the relevant participation constraint (18)
is the one for the VH-type. Indeed, writing out the condition for the VL-type
(denoting the c.d.f. of ¼O by F), one has
E¼ max(VL + ¼
O ¡ D
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¤ ¡ VL ¡ ¼)dF(¼)
¸ E¼ max(VH + ¼
O ¡ D
¤;0) ¡ VH:
The set of assumptions in Proposition 5 may look restrictive, but they are
fairly natural. Condition (A1) simply states that debt is risky, a necessary
restriction for our analysis, which does not apply to the case of riskless debt.
Condition (A2) is the participation constraint for the VH-type. If it is
violated, the more valuable …rm prefers to forego raising funds for the new
venture. If the VH-type accepts the dilution of existing …rm value brought
about by the debt contract, the VL type does so, too (since they stand to
gain from the overpriced funding). Condition (A2) is a strengthening of the
condition that the project has positive net present value: the project should
be su¢ciently pro…table for the …rm to be interesting, even if the mispricing
of the issued securities implies that the …rm must give up part of its existing
v a l u ei ns o m ec o n t i n g e n c i e s .
Condition (A3) concerns the moral hazard problem. In its simpli…ed form
given here, it is easy to interpret: If investors receive a su¢cient part of to-
tal returns of a bad …rm, VL + E¼TO, to break even, then the remainder is
not attractive enough to keep the …rm honest (in the terms of Holmström
and Tirole (1997), the …rm’s pledgeable income is not su¢cient). Conditions
(A4) and (A5) concern the dilution problem of equity, which must be suf-
…ciently strong for both types of …rms, in order to rule out equity …nance.
26Interestingly, and di¤erent from the simplest Myers-Majluf case, it can be
shown that neither of the two conditions implies the other.
Clearly, there are conditions under which other equilibria are possible.
T h ec a s ew es t u d yi so n ei nw h i c ht h ei n v e s t m e n ti sv a l u a b l ee n o u g ht o
encourage external …nancing even if securities are mispriced, but not so large
as to make owners insensitive to a proper pricing of existing activities or to
make moral hazard negligeable.
A qualitative interpretation of the conditions in Proposition 5 yields the
following rough taxonomy. For the proposed pooling equilibrium to exist,
the di¤erence between returns under transparency and opaqueness should
not be too large (in order to make the deviations in A3, A4, and A5 not
too attractive), VH should not be too large (for the high type’s participation
constraint (A2)) and not too small (for the dilution constraint (A4)), VL
should not be too large (for the moral hazard constraint (A3) and the dilution
constraint (A5)), and I should be neither too high (for the participation
constraint (A2)) nor too low (for the moral hazard constraint (A3) and the
dilution constraint (A5)).
For concreteness and to get a sense of the order of magnitudes, Table
1 provides quantitative information for a simulation of the model with the
following parameter speci…cations. For the product market stage, we …x
q = ° = :5 and µH =2 µL =1 0 0 .T h i sy i e l d sE¼TO = 1078 and E¼OO = 1056.
We further …x h = :5 (equal proportion of high and low asset value …rms),
let VL and VH vary, and investigate the constraints on I de…ned by (A1) to
(A5). Table 1 reports the result for six di¤erent combinations of (VL;V H).










(0;400) 540 (A3) 950 (A2)
(0;800) 540 (A3) 870 (A2)
(400;800) 740 (A5) 970 (A2)
(0;1200) 540 (A3) 860 (A2)
(400;1200) 750 (A5) 960 (A2)
(800;1200) 1150 (A5) 1050 (A2)
Table 1
These simulations re‡ect the rough taxonomy developed above; note that
in the given speci…cation the dilution constraint (A4) of the H-type is redun-
27dant (this changes for di¤erent values of h). Note also that for su¢ciently
high and homogenous values of existing asset values (the last row of Table 1),
the dilution constraint of the L-type (A5) and the participation constraint
(A2) of the H-type are inconsistent: the L-type’s asset base is su¢ciently
important and similar to that of the H-type for him to no longer want to pool
with the H-type at conditions that are acceptable to the H-type. Although
these results are, of course, only illustrative, they show that the parame-
ter values described by conditions (A1) to (A5) form a su¢ciently large set
and are of the right order of magnitude to make the proposed equilibrium
relevant.
This allows us to characterize the …rm characteristics for which our equi-
librium of bank dominance and opaqueness is most relevant: …rms with a
large, pro…table investment opportunity and moderate amount of assets in
place, but with some uncertainty concerning their value, prone to a moral
hazard con‡ict between insiders and outsiders, because of the ability of man-
agers to divert resources according to their own goals.
Notice that if the …rm is a young venture with few initial assets and lit-
tle uncertainty about these assets (VH small), the value of the new project
will swamp any consideration of dilution, and equity …nancing would be pre-
ferred. This suggests that new …rms with high growth opportunities are less
likely to use bank debt, particularly if they are in a sector in which the gain
from establishing leadership (i.e. the ability to show a strong competitive
position via transparency) far exceed the cost of mispricing initial assets.24
At the same time, concentrated ownership of equity will emerge in sectors
and in countries in which it is hard to control moral hazard, and where there
are strong strategic advantages to establish market leadership. This is con-
sistent with the empirical results in the literature on the legal determinants
of ownership (LaPorta et al., 1999).
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have highlighted the impact of the dominant investors on
the di¤usion of information. In particular, we provide a rationale for the
24A high net present value of new ventures can also help to overcome the moral hazard
risk of appropriation of new funding, since then appropriating investment funds is less
attractive than capturing (a part of) the NPV of new investment. In this case there is less
need of a concentrated investor structure.
28observation that lender-dominated …rms are often more opaque. We suggest
that even besides the lower degree of transparency accompanying private
debt …nancing, public disclosure and the informativeness of security prices
may be deliberately discouraged by a dominant lender in order to reduce the
riskiness of his loan.
An interesting side result is that the informational advantage of an opaque
…rm facing a transparent competitor does not translate in an outright com-
petitive advantage. While lack of transparency ensures that it is shielded
when in a weak competitive position, when the …rm is in a strong position
it cannot take full advantage of mutual knowledge of its strength to restrain
output by competitors, losing market share precisely when its product is
relatively pro…table. Hence, the value of transparency depends on whether
investors are interested in the upside or the downside of pro…ts.
As a basis for our analysis of the in‡uence of lender control on …rm trans-
parency, the paper also provides a rational for lender control. Our argument
synthesizes two strands of the literature - the capital structure theory in the
tradition of Myers and Majluf (1984) and the corporate control literature in
the spirit of Holmström and Tirole (1997). We argue that although there
is a downside to lender control - strategic interference which yields lower
expected pro…ts -, there is an important upside - the control of managerial
moral hazard. If the …rm’s asset structure and environment makes man-
agerial moral hazard an important issue (Á =1 ), if the e¢ciency loss from
opaqueness (E¼T ¡ E¼O) is not too large, if the required injection of funds
(I) is su¢ciently large, but still small enough to make the project su¢ciently
pro…table, and if the evaluation of existing …rm value is su¢ciently di¢cult
(VH ¡ VL large and h not too close to 1), we argue that …rms will …nd it
optimal to seek debt …nance from a dominant investor.
Our notion of debtor control captures a limited, but probably important
part in some institutional settings of the corporate governance problem. One
quali…cation, however, that bears repeating is that in order to exert control,
debt holders must act in a concerted manner, which is usually impossible if
debt is widely held, and that equity must be relatively weak. This is due to
the fact that out of bankruptcy, equity has the formal control rights and can,
therefore, impose its preferences on debt holders (unless explicitly restricted
by covenants). As a consequence, we have the following rough taxonomy
to anchor the classi…cation of our theory institutionally. “Equity control”
is present whenever equity is strong (in particular, there is a large, active
owner). “Debt control” prevails if equity is weak and there are in‡uential debt
29holders, in particular banks. Finally, if equity and debt are both relatively
weak (e.g., widely held), we expect neither of our two modes to prevail,
but rather management to be in control. In this latter case, our approach
suggests that whether management has a preference towards opaqueness or
transparency depends on whether its compensation package is more sensitive
to downside risk or upside potential.
In an international context, our notion of debt control is presumably
more relevant to Japanese or European than to US companies, where equity
or management control seems to be the norm out of Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
Thus on average our model predicts higher corporate transparency in the US
(and perhaps the UK) relative to Japan and Europe.
On the corporate level, we predict that the following attributes of pub-
licly traded companies be clustered: equity dominance (in particular, concen-
trated, non-institutional ownership), managerial compensation in the form of
stock options, corporate transparency, (relatively) informative stock prices,
and volatile earnings. On the other side, we expect to observe jointly: bank
debt with active monitoring, less corporate transparency, less informative
stock prices, and less volatile earnings. In fact, the paper predicts a kind
of stickiness of opaqueness in the following sense. In equilibrium, investors
in Á =1- …rms (those who are di¢cult to monitor and control in the …rst
place) will choose opaqueness, and Á =0- …rms will be transparent. Hence,
if the …rm is di¢cult to monitor ex ante, it will be non-transparent ex-post,
and vice versa.
Our model allows for several interesting extensions which may shed light
on some recent trends in European capital markets. In the explicit mar-
ket microstructure model in Perotti and von Thadden (1998), if market
depth (i.e. the amount of noise trading) increases, informed trading prof-
its increase. Suppose that initially corporate boards dominated by banks
keep …rms opaque so as to discourage information-gathering. Once liquid-
ity increases enough, informed trading becomes pro…table, and a policy of
opaqueness can no longer restrains information dissemination. Then corpo-
rations will tend to become more transparent against the wishes of dominant
debtholders. We would therefore argue that the large in‡ux of international
capital into the (continental) European …nancial market since the mid 1990s
and the recent shift to more transparency of many European companies are
related phenomena. Opaqueness of publicly traded companies may be in-
creasingly hard to sustain as trading liquidity rises due to rising global in-
vestment ‡ows.
307 Appendix
In this appendix, we provide the equilibrium quantities and pro…ts for the
three di¤erent possible informational structures in the product market. They
are obtained by standard calculations. Throughout, we impose assumptions
(2) and (3), which assure that quantities and prices are positive. For the case
of competition under symmetric information (T;T), the formulae are in the
main text.
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